Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. This paper will examine the largest reserve component of the Army (the Army National Guard) and pose two questions. First, is the Army National Guard (ARNG) structured to effectively support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) in the future? The answer to that question is "no". The ARNG does not have the right force structure to effectively support the objectives of the national security and military strategies, especially if an increased number of smaller and long-term contingencies continue at home and abroad. The employment of the ARNG in its current structure does not lend itself to fostering the will of the people, the politicians and the retention of ARNG soldiers, which are still important to our resolve and ability to stay the course in pursuit of our national strategies.
ARNG IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES: IS THE ARNG FORCE STRUCTURED TO BE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT?
The three components of the Army (Active, Guard and Reserve) are still structured to support the mid-20 th century concept of massive mobilizations for major war. Given the recent history of the last 20 years is the Total Army correctly structured for conducting war across the full spectrum or continuum? The short answer is "no". Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, in his speech at the Association of United States Army Luncheon on October 7, 2003 said, "We are now deployed in 120 countries around the world. Our OPTEMPO is high…We are in fact an Army at War." The realities of the full spectrum combat operations and prolonged deployments in multiple countries seem to suggest that while still very capable, the Army's force structure is askew.
This paper will examine the largest reserve component of the Army (the Army National Guard) and pose two questions. First, is the Army National Guard (ARNG) structured to effectively support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) in the future? The answer to that question is "no". The ARNG does not have the right force structure to effectively support the objectives of the national security and military strategies, especially if an increased number of smaller and long-term contingencies continue at home and abroad. The employment of the ARNG in its current structure does not lend itself to fostering the will of the people, the politicians and the retention of ARNG soldiers, which are still important to our resolve and ability to stay the course in pursuit of our national strategies.
Secondly, if the ARNG structure is not right, then how should it change? What should be the primary roles and missions for the ARNG? Two options for the basis of an ARNG force structure change will be reviewed -Homeland Security and full spectrum of operations. Lastly, recommendations will be made as to how ARNG structure should be adjusted based on the recommended primary role for the ARNG.
CURRENT TOTAL ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE
To better understand the current force structure mix between the ARNG, United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Active Army components refer to the figure below. There are four key points. The ARNG is 38% of the entire Army force structure. The largest percentage of the Army's combat and combat support units are in the ARNG -56% and 40% respectively. The combat service support units are about equally divided between the three components. Lastly, there are basically no combat arms units in the Reserves. All combat arms units are in the Active or ARNG components.
Since the chart below lists all units by numbers of Battalions, a point of reference should be provided. This second type of mission (SSCs), also referred to complex contingency operations (CCOs), has a stronger alignment within the NSS and NMS and so are now of greater importance than were previously delineated.
The predominantly mechanized and heavy force structure of the Cold War is obsolete as it does not balance priorities of the current NSS and NMS. Since 8 out of 18 of the Army's combat Division are in the ARNG, this is a significant amount of force that is out of balance with the smaller contingency operations mentioned above.
The NSS outlines the direction the military must take: "The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold
War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur." 2 We cannot afford to waste the limited resources of the nation on equipment we are unlikely to need and on soldiers trained to do the wrong jobs.
Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) focus on the military's need to conduct rapid and precise operations using a capabilities-based approach to achieve full spectrum dominance to deter and defeat adversaries. This means conducting a It is important to note two points here . The Stabilization Force (SFOR) Bosnia is an ARNG divisional headquarters (minus) with about two battalions. This means that the majority of the Division's combat forces (two full Brigades and one Battalion) were not used for the SFOR rotation. At the same time this sole example of the use of a portion of an ARNG divisional headquarters is provided, remember the only reason this headquarters was used was because the Active Army component needed the ARNG to relieve its forces so that they could be prepared for another operation. The Army looked upon the mission as one that needed to be done, but could be transitioned to the ARNG's combat force. It is important to realize the Army effectively felt driven to this option because of increasing operational tempo.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND ARNG FORCE USAGE HIGHLIGHTS
From mid-1980s until mid-1990s overall peacekeeping and related UN actions have doubled from an average of about 10 per year to more than 20 per year. Additionally, UN missions in response to domestic conflicts have more than tripled, rising from less than 5 per year during the 1980s to an average of roughly 17 per year. 4 We must plan on establishing a better force mix since we can count on this level of missioning for the Total Army for the foreseeable future. It is important to note that if the ARNG undergoes an internal restructuring the Army could reduce the need to repeatedly call up units with specialized functions without dramatically altering the overall active-reserve balance and strength.
Meanwhile, the active Army has been reduced from 18 to 10 Divisions. Our military has continued its reduction in size from the Cold War to the present, but during this same time our national and state civilian leadership has placed increasing demands on those smaller forces.
According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, an indication of this increased operational tempo has been the growing reliance on the Reserve Component. 5 "About 147,000 Guard and
Reserve troops are mobilized for active duty, including 78,000 Guard members." 6 This is a very large number in light of the fact that only about 62,000 ARNG solders were called up in 1990-91
in support of the first Iraq War. 7 In the last two years, more than 212,000 Reservists and National Guard troops have been mobilized for operations overseas and the fight against terrorism at home. This is the largest such mobilization since World War II. Defense Artillery Battery of the Florida Army National Guard. The 400 unit members will be among about 5,000 Guard soldiers nationwide who will be retrained to perform a temporary duty.
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ANALYSIS OF THE WILL OF PEOPLE
The impact of the "will of the people" or public support on the Nation's ability to stay the course in pursuit of national interests should not be underestimated. We cannot wait until the ARNG experiences a downward trend in retention due to employer conflicts, repetitive and/or long term deployments and family separation. The ARNG structure needs to be adjusted now to minimize the negative impacts that the civilian sector After analyzing the same National Guard Bureau survey statistics provided above, others come to a different conclusion. They argue that no major reduction in retention will occur. 21 The idea is that this survey is only one tool, is a small sample and also that soldiers will change their minds once they get back home with their families.
POTENTIAL ARNG RETENTION ISSUES
IMPACTS OF STOP LOSS POLICY ON RETENTION
Generally, both the ARNG and Army leadership is still saying that retention within the The stop loss policy is necessary for maintaining capable, trained units. We must ensure there is not a mass exodus of soldiers, who change their minds about their level of commitment after being told of a pending unit deployment. Ultimately, however, retention is kept artificially higher now while stop loss is still in effect and deployments continue.
STRESS ON THE RESERVE COMPONENTS DUE TO HIGH MOBILIZATION USAGE
There are three aspects of stress on the ARNG and Reserve during periods of high mobilization. They are frequency of mobilization, percent of inventory used and duration. It is important to understand how the composition of the ARNG leads to stress on the force. "A review of current Reserve Component (ARNG and Reserve) usage pointed to three measurable factors that, when taken together, provide a good assessment of stress on the force." 22 It is reasonable to assume the target frequency of deployments or mobilizations is one in six years, as has been proposed by Army and ARNG leadership and now substantiated by the Office of Secretary of Defense's study, "Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve" published in January 2004. It is also reasonable to assume the ARNG will not increase in size. This means that no more than 17 percent of the force in any particular skill or career field should be each year. Based on current operations, the usage percents for a number of low density/high demand stressed specialties are unsustainably high. 23 The table below depicts the percentage of inventory that has been used in eight of the higher stressed specialties. The definition of higher stressed specialties is those with a usage rate of more than 34 percent during the last 2 years of current operations. 24 Units in the ARNG force with predominately these skills are the best candidates for the conversion of non-used combat, combat support and combat service support ARNG force structure reprogramming. bpeckil Forces bb 24
Higher Stressed Specialties
The conversion of unused or little used structure, like field artillery, air defense and divisional headquarters units, will greatly assist in reducing stress on low density/high demand units which should also minimize retention issues in the ARNG. Ultimately, the mission or role adopted must be: based on minimizing retention issues;
TWO PRIMARY OPTIONS FOR FORCE STRUCTURE REBALANCING: HOMELAND SECURITY OR FULL SPECTRUM CAPABLE FORCE
compatible with the will of the people, the political environment and the national strategic environment. The second option, basing the ARNG force structure on the role of full spectrum capable force for the ARNG, would support all these variables. Finally, since the Army is expected to continue to be expeditionary with missions along the full spectrum of operations this is a prevalent part of our national strategy and as such, much of the force (all components of the force-Active Army, ARNG and Reserve) still need to be able to respond to that type of mission.
If we were to use Homeland Security as the primary mission and therefore redirect the force structure towards those missions, then the ARNG would not be able to provide support for the Army's rotational base in the global security environment while still being prepared to support the Nation for a major regional crisis. A fair amount of the "war fight" only structure would no longer be warranted in the ARNG as this combat arms structure does not support Homeland Security missions.
Although too in depth for the scope of this paper, there are important and necessary Active Army and USAR force structure changes that should accompany force rebalancing within the ARNG. The Active Component's force structure balancing should effectively follow the same full spectrum changes as recommended for the ARNG. The USAR, being primarily combat support and combat service support, should convert some of its historically unused structure to further reduce the overall Army problem of Low Density/High Demand units, while also adding some additional Homeland Security specific units to round out the capabilities remaining in the ARNG. This would ensure that all the components were best aligned with the national strategies and operational environments for the long term.
FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUPPORT A FULL SPECTRUM CAPABLE FORCE
So what are some key pieces of the force structure that should be changed to support a full spectrum capable force? There are two main pieces which need to be addressed through a rebalancing of the current ARNG force. Unfortunately, this part of the problem is not the primary purpose of this paper and cannot be covered in a depth that would do it full justice. Enough information will be provided here to give the outline of the force structure changes from which a full rebalancing plan could be developed.
First, the ARNG must increase the number of high demand units used repeatedly and/or for longer duration (more than one year), thereby spreading the mobilizations over more of the ARNG force. Some foundational statistics on this topic have been provided as it related to retention, but it also relates to the increased missions within the Army in support of national strategies. Secondly and concurrently, the portions of the ARNG force which have not been used in the last 10-15 years needs to be adjusted to meet the reoccurring, smaller, full spectrum of missions which are to be expected for the next few decades. The Nation cannot afford to have idle (unused) resources.
In addition to increasing the number of high demand (or high stressed) units, 3 28 It is estimated that only about 10-12 percent of the force is concentrated in the career fields that need to be changed due to the high usage problem. Underlying much of the discussion in this paper, has been the concept of integration within a variety of mission types meaning that our ability to conduct joint, multi-national and coalition operations will be a repetitive theme for our military. That said, the additional recommendation I now bring forward is the conversion of about half of the ARNG Divisional
Headquarters into standing Joint Task Force Headquarters which would adjust about 6,000
spaces into more appropriate, useful structure. This type of headquarters is more capable of dealing with much of the full spectrum of operations globally-that includes here at home. The Divisional Headquarters have not been used in their current form and these new headquarters could still be capable of mobilizing to reduce the demands on the Active force which have become increasingly difficult for the Active Component to maintain coverage.
CONCLUSION --THE WAY AHEAD
The ARNG force must be realigned to meet the full spectrum challenges of the NSS and NMS in the 21 st century. We still need to stay the course of the philosophical ideas of General Creighton Abrams, former Army Chief of Staff, "If we go to war again, we're taking the reserves with us." 32 We must use the Reserve Component, but must do so more effectively with lessened negative impact from the public, congressional, and military perspectives. At the same time the ARNG must still be ready to augment the Active force with low density/low demand specialties, more rotational combat units and combat unit headquarters for relief in multiple theaters, and have "dual use" structure for Homeland Security missions.
The last 10-12 years have demonstrated an increased use of the military in smaller scale contingencies in the U.S. and abroad with repetitive requirements for some specific types of units. This has therefore caused the over employment of some specific segments of the ARNG.
This level of participation in United Nations, coalition missions and Homeland Security will continue along the same lines of its current trend for the next decade. Adjusting the ARNG force structure to support the full spectrum of military operations can make available a more effective and efficient force without negatively impacting public support for the Army and the Nation as the ARNG is employed. The adjusted ARNG force structure outlined here would reduce the frequency of mobilizations and deployments, more correctly align unit missions, training, and command and control while still keeping some "dual use" structure also suited to Homeland Security missions.
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